

From the Bottom-Up: Sectarian Integration of the Bureaucracy and Support for Anti-Government Violence in Divided Societies

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Abstract

How does the demographic makeup of political institutions affect the likelihood of sectarian conflict? Bureaucrats are responsible for interpreting laws and distributing government services. I argue that in divided societies, the integration of key bureaucratic institutions can reduce intergroup violence. I develop a theory of bottom-up integration in which the integration of non-elites into policy-implementing institutions reduces individual-level support for anti-government violence. Bottom-up integration allows the government to credibly commit to the security of vulnerable groups, addressing a commitment problem that may otherwise lead to conflict. I test this theory in the context of the police in two divided societies, Israel and Iraq. Results from two surveys with an embedded experiment show that integration of the police reduces support for anti-government violence among citizens from vulnerable minority groups. Consistent with the credible commitment argument, I find that these individuals are less fearful of future repression by government.

Violent conflicts emerge along ethnic or religious lines with alarming frequency. Separatists in Northern Ireland, insurgents in Iraq, and suicide bombers in Israel are distinguished by their ethnic or religious differences from their opponents. Yet, despite the high profile of these conflicts, groups in diverse societies coexist peacefully with one another the vast majority of the time (Fearon and Laitin 1996). In divided societies in which ascriptive identities are highly politicized, how can political institutions be designed to minimize the likelihood of violent conflict?

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This article develops a theory of bottom-up integration in which sectarian integration of bureaucratic institutions reduces individual-level incentives to support violent conflict. Existing research on institutional solutions to sectarian conflict focuses on policy-making institutions like legislatures and executives. Discussion centers on electoral laws that ensure representation for minorities (Horowitz 2004), the centralization of executive power (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Cederman et al. 2015; McGarry 2005), and whether legislative processes foster majoritarian or consociational decision making (Lijphart 1969, 1984). Yet policy-making institutions are only part of the story. Bureaucratic institutions have considerable discretion over the way in which policies are implemented (Lipsky 1980). Where identity is politically relevant, citizens should care deeply about the demographic makeup of these policy-implementing institutions. Where identity-based cleavages are so severe as to lead to violent conflict, altering the demographic makeup of the bureaucracy may affect citizens' incentives to support or participate in sectarian conflict.

Power asymmetries across groups create a credible commitment problem (Lake and Rothchild 1996; de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997). The power advantage held by the state prevents it from committing not to take advantage of less powerful groups. This commitment problem provides incentives for vulnerable groups to build up their defenses or engage in preemptive strikes, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Integrating key bureaucratic institutions can address this commitment problem. Integration signals that the state does not intend to repress. The signal is credible because integration would be costly for a state that attempted to repress members of the integrated group. Members of vulnerable groups that are integrated should thus be less fearful of future repression, reducing their incentives to support or participate in violent sectarian conflict.

I test bottom-up integration in the context of a key policy-implementing institution, the police. I ask how integration of the police affects support for the use of anti-government violence. This question is tested in two divided societies, Israel and Iraq, using a survey with an embedded experiment. I polled 800 citizens in each country on their perceptions about

the police and the government, as well as their willingness to use violence under certain conditions. To gain greater traction on the causal relationship between integration and support for violence, an experiment primed a random subset of respondents with information about the police's level of integration. I find that members of vulnerable minority groups in both countries are less likely to consider using violence against the government when they have information that the police are integrated. The survey then tests the credible commitment mechanism directly. Results show that individuals who perceive the police as less integrated are also less fearful that the government might harm them, consistent with the argument that bottom-up integration reduces support for violence by addressing the credible commitment problem.

Government Inclusiveness in Divided Societies: Top-Down versus Bottom-Up

A rich line of research asks how institutions in divided societies affect intergroup conflict (Fearon 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Horowitz 1985; Laitin 2007; Cederman et al. 2010). Traditional power sharing solutions, highlighted by Lijphart (1969, 1984)'s *consociationalism*, focus on ensuring that minority voices are heard in the policy-making process. Power sharing is often applied in the form of reserved legislative or executive positions for each relevant group (Norris 2008). For example, the Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's bloody civil war in 1989 mandates a 50/50 ratio of Christian and Muslim members of parliament, and divides power between the Sunni-held prime ministerial position and the Christian-held presidency. Similarly, the Transitional Administrative Law implemented in Iraq by the United States and its allies between 2004 and 2005 divided the executive branch into three positions, one for each of Iraq's three largest sects: Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds.

These applications share a top-down approach to inclusiveness, focusing on elite-level representation in decision-making institutions like the legislature or the executive. Top-down approaches assume that the concerns of the masses can be addressed by inclusiveness across

ethnic elites and that elites have control over members of their own group (Nordlinger 1972). The implication is that if the masses do not trust their elites or cannot agree on who the relevant elites are, the institutional arrangement may not be sustainable. Despite shared identity, elites do not necessarily represent or speak for their coethnics. Top-down power sharing also provides little insight into how an identity group that is internally divided might be effectively represented by a single leader. Finally, top-down power sharing privileges the very ethnic elites who benefit the most from existing intergroup divisions, incentivizing political decisions which perpetuate conflict (Roeder 2005).

Bottom-Up Representation via Policy-Implementing Institutions

In focusing narrowly on the policy-making process, top-down approaches to power sharing give little thought to the way that laws are enacted and enforced. Decision-makers at the top levels of government are responsible for determining policies, but citizens' experiences with those policies depend on the way in which they are implemented. Laws are not enforced by presidents, legislators, and governors, but by bureaucrats who often have considerable discretion over the way that policies affect citizens in real terms (Lipsky 1980; Evans 1995). This discretion allows individual bureaucrats to determine policy outcomes (Dincecco and Ravanilla 2016).

Bottom-up integration is the inclusion of non-elites within a policy-implementing institution so that bureaucrats from all groups serve citizens from all groups, and so that members of each group are included in sufficient numbers that the functioning of the institution depends on their participation. Bottom-up integration focuses on inclusiveness within institutions rather than control over them, allowing bureaucrats from different groups to monitor and check one another's behavior. Bottom-up integration diverges from power sharing in both the nature of the institutions and the status of the individuals who are included. Bottom-up integration deals with institutions that employ large numbers of non-elites and are responsible for the distribution of goods and services, for instance public healthcare,

education, regulatory agencies, police, and fire departments. As Lipsky (1980) points out, the government policies citizens observe are not those designed by legislatures but rather some version that has been filtered through the bureaucracy. Second, bottom-up integration works via ordinary citizens rather than elites. It therefore makes no assumptions about elites' control over the masses and avoids reliance on those who have the most to gain from intergroup divisions (Roeder 2005). Finally, whereas top-down power sharing occurs along a single identity cleavage, integrating large numbers of non-elites allows for diverse, multidimensional representation across a variety of societal cleavages.

Recent research explores the effects of integration in a handful of bureaucratic institutions. Evidence from the militaries in Burundi (Samii 2013) and Malaysia (Ostwald 2013) suggests that increased ethnic representation decreases prejudicial behavior against non-coethnics and increases expressions of civic identity. Integration also affects concrete policy outcomes. Shayo and Zussman (2011) find that Israeli court claims are more likely to be accepted when the claimant is from the same ethnic group as the judge. Also using Israeli courts, Grossman et al. (2015) find that Arab defendants receive more lenient sentences when there is at least one Arab judge on an appeals panel. Finally, Lyall (2010) finds that military units are more effective at preventing future insurgent activity when soldiers come from the same ethnic group as the insurgents.

The Police as a Political Institution

This article focuses on the police as an example of a policy-implementing institution. A typical police force is made up primarily of rank-and-file patrol officers who in most cases can be considered non-elites. The ubiquitous nature of policing means that all citizens should be aware of policing as a possible career path, and there should be no geographic barriers preventing individuals from working as officers. While policing certainly requires specialized skills, most large departments provide the necessary training for new recruits. Barriers to entry, in other words, are low.

The activities of the police are highly political. The primary role of the police is to provide security for citizens, including crime prevention as well as more mundane activities like traffic enforcement. These activities are frequently described as issues of “public safety.” The provision of security is a key *raison d’être* of the state (Olson 1993). Furthermore, the police are directly responsible for enforcing the laws passed by the government and are authorized to use force in doing so, making the actions and attitudes of officers politically relevant. Existing social science research on the police as an institution is extensive, covering everything from the effectiveness of various policing tactics (Bayley and Weisburd 2011), to the way that neighborhood design affects crime (Newman 1973), to the relationship between police officers and citizens in divided societies (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). However, with a few notable exceptions (Bayley 1971; Weitzer 1995; Levitt 1997) researchers have not engaged the police as a *political* institution, one which plays a direct role in politics by enforcing laws and distributing public goods.

The police play an especially important role in divided societies where they employ large numbers of individuals, arm and organize them, and task them with distributing a fundamental public good: public safety. Discrimination in the provision of public safety can exacerbate social and economic inequalities, causing a cycle in which sectarian behaviors increase due to the expectation of ethnic or racial discrimination in law enforcement. Individuals who expect to be treated poorly by the police because of their group identity are more likely to view law enforcement as illegitimate and engage in criminal, sectarian, or anti-government behavior as a result (Tyler 1990). Indeed, Grossman et al. (2015, 2) argue that unequal treatment by the courts can damage the legitimacy of the justice system, and thereby minorities attitudes toward the state institutions and their duties and responsibilities as law-abiding citizens. Thus, citizens’ interactions with and attitudes towards the police should be expected to significantly influence their attitudes towards the government more generally.

Reducing Fear, Solving Commitment Problems

Bottom-up integration of the police should reduce sectarian conflict by reducing the incentives of vulnerable group members to participate in violence. Power asymmetries between groups create a commitment problem: even if the dominant group has no intention of using its power advantage to take advantage of weaker groups, it has no way to commit not to do so. As a result, the weaker group has an incentive to increase its defenses or launch a preemptive attack, actions which can lead to conflict (Fearon 1995, 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 1993; de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997; Jervis 1978). These incentives are exacerbated by a history of negative interactions between the groups in question (Wendt 1992). Indeed, the inability of the dominant group to commit to the future security of a weaker one may explain why civil conflict is so persistent once it begins (Fearon and Laitin 2003): in the absence of a credible commitment to security, combatants are unwilling to relinquish their capabilities for unilateral protection (Walter 1997). Asymmetric power across groups characterizes relationships between Iraq's dominant Shias and minority Sunnis, as well as between Jews and Arabs in Israel, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Turks and Kurds in Turkey, and dozens of other ethnic or religious groups in conflicts across the globe. In each case, even if the dominant group has no intention of harming the weaker group, the impossibility of committing not to do so provides the weaker group with reason to keep its guard up, creating an environment ripe for conflict.

Bottom-up integration may reduce the likelihood of violence by allowing the state to credibly commit not to repress weaker groups. Integration makes future repression more costly to carry out, making it a credible signal of the state's peaceful intentions. For example, including members of a group in the police makes the day-to-day operations of the police dependent upon their participation. In the event of a conflict, officers from minority groups can impose costs on the state by withholding participation, severely reducing the capacity of the state to deliver the services that citizens expect. Bottom-up integration also organizes individuals, aiding coordination and making fighting less costly. Integration of the police

may be especially relevant, as police officers in most conflict-prone communities are armed and have access to communications equipment, vehicles, and other items that would increase their capacity for fighting back against a repressive state.

In equilibrium, we should not expect bureaucrats from previously-excluded groups to actually use their new-found powers in these ways. Given the expectation that only a government not intending to repress would allow integration in the first place, these individuals should interpret integration as a credible commitment to peace, giving them little incentive to resist against the state. The integration of the police in Northern Ireland as part of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement provides a real-world illustration of bottom-up integration. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had very few Catholic officers and was perceived by many as a tool of Protestant oppression for the latter half of the 20th century (Weitzer 1995; McGarry 2000). Reforms to the RUC called for a dramatic increase in the number of Catholic officers via heavy recruitment in Catholic neighborhoods and generous retirement incentives for Protestant officers. The renamed Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI) increased the percentage of Catholic officers from roughly 10% in the mid-1990's to 30% in 2015. Almost two decades after reforms began, the newly-empowered Catholic police officers have yet to turn their weapons against the state.

These mechanisms work explicitly through *information* that civilians have about police integration. It is not necessarily the case that proportionality alone should have the effects described here, nor is there some threshold for inclusion above which attitudes towards conflict will shift. Rather, integration is likely to be effective when citizens perceive that their group has sufficient influence within state institutions to impose significant costs on the state. Changing the actual degree of integration is simply a source of information that changes citizens' *perceptions* about integration, but integration should only be expected to shift citizens' attitudes when they are cognizant of it.

Analysis: Bottom-Up Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence

The above discussion yields several hypotheses about the effects of police integration on citizen support for anti-government violence, as well as attitudes towards the police and the government.

H₁: Individuals from vulnerable groups who believe the police are more integrated will be less likely to support the use of anti-government violence.

H₂: Individuals from vulnerable groups who believe the police are more integrated will express less fear of the police.

H₃: Individuals from vulnerable groups who believe the police are more integrated will express less fear of repression by the government.

Ethno-Religious Identity in the Israeli Police

The state of Israel balances two identities, that of a Jewish state and that of a democracy.¹ Israel's non-Jewish population, which makes up about 20% of the total citizenry, has the same legal rights and responsibilities as do Jewish citizens on nearly all issues.² There are no legal impediments to Arab citizens participating in either policy-making or policy-implementing institutions. In practice, however, social and political norms have led to the under-representation of non-Jews in all levels of government. This under-representation for

¹The discussion and analysis in this paper is limited to the parts of Israel which fall under civil law, which excludes Gaza and the West Bank.

²Israeli laws generally do not differentiate on the basis of religious or ethnic identity. A notable exception is laws requiring military service, from which most Arabs are exempt.

Arab-Israeli citizens runs in parallel with the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the two issues are no doubt linked, the conflict between Arab citizens and the state of Israel constitutes a separate challenge for policymakers.

The Israel Police is a national police force tasked with enforcing laws and maintaining public safety throughout the country. The police are made up of approximately 28,000 sworn officers who are supported by more than 30,000 volunteers.³ In 2014, approximately 87% of all officers were Jewish, compared to about 80% of the general population.⁴ This number represents a slight increase in representation for non-Jews in the Israel Police after many years of stagnant under-representation. In 1967 the police was 10.3% Arab; as recently as 2003 it was 10.5% Arab (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). Thus, non-Jews are included in the police, and the level of inclusion has increased over the last decade, but they remain underrepresented. The question of representation becomes more complicated when we break the non-Jewish category into its constituent religious groups. Some groups are significantly over-represented, while others are under-represented. In 2014, Muslims⁵ made up only about 4% of full-time officers despite being more than 17% of the population. Druze,⁶ on the other hand, are over-represented with 7.4% of police officers compared to only 1.6% of the population. Figure 1 shows that while the number of officers has increased for all non-Jewish religious groups, the changes are driven by a disproportionately large increase in the number of Druze officers.⁷

In 2014 the police launched a major recruitment effort which put special focus on increasing the number of Arab recruits. Police Commissioner Yohanan Danino told a confer-

³<http://www.police.gov.il/GraphSkifout.aspx?mid=67>


⁴Figures on officer demographics provided to the author by the Israel Police in response to a freedom of information request.

⁵Calculated by combining the “Muslim” and “Bedouin” categories listed in the Police data. The vast majority of Bedouins in Israel are Muslim. Despite the labels used in the official police data, the distinction between the two groups is ethnic or tribal, not religious. When dealing with religious demographics, then, it makes sense to consider these as a single group.

⁶Druze are ethnic Arabs who follow a religion similar to, but distinct from, Islam. In Israel they are often considered by Jews to be a “special” minority, one that is more politically-integrated than others. As a community, the Druze have largely accepted the Israeli government as legitimate and participate widely in state institutions. Unlike other Arabs, the Druze serve in the military in large numbers, including in combat units. Despite their political attachment to the state, the Druze community remains culturally distinct from Jewish Israelis.

⁷Source: Israel Police

Figure 1: Israel Police Demographics by Religion



ence of Arab mayors, “I urge the Arab leadership to call on [Arab citizens] in every possible forum to join the Israel Police” (Kubovich 2007). This recruitment drive followed a similar effort in 2005 during which the police made a conscious effort to increase the number of Arab recruits.⁸ Yet, Arabs and other minorities face an uphill battle in gaining employment with the police. The most significant barrier for employment is that the hiring process privileges those with military combat experience, something that virtually no Arabs have. According to one high-ranking officer involved in the training process, however, the police recognize that there are advantages to having officers from minority communities and therefore go out of their way to recruit them. The police use different hiring standards for Arab applicants to ensure that they are able to hire a sufficient number of minorities. When asked specifically about whether the use of combat experience as a hiring criteria is justified, the officer explained that the desire for recruits with combat experience is not just about practical skills but that these individuals tend to have a “higher level of maturity” for their experiences. Of course, he says, with Muslim Arabs this is not an option. As a substitute, the police try to

⁸Nahmias, Roe. “Police Recruit Arabs to Boost Equality.” Ynetnews. 23 December 2005 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3189198,00.html>

recruit Arabs from the universities.⁹

Despite these policies, the police struggle to recruit significant numbers of qualified candidates from certain communities. One likely reason is that even if hiring practices do not prevent Arab applicants from being recruited, the belief that these barriers exist may be enough to stop Arab job-seekers from applying. One survey of Israeli Arabs finds that 31% of respondents believe that Arabs are prevented from joining the police because of their ethnic background (Hasisi and Weitzer 2007). Furthermore, support among Arabs for joining the police is mixed. One common argument is that the system discriminates against Arabs, so why should they become part of the system (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Others worry that joining the police will lead to undesired assimilation. Yet, there does appear to be sufficient willingness to participate to make the police reasonably representative of the Arab, and perhaps even the Muslim, population. A survey of Arabs in Northern Israel finds that 60% of respondents support the recruitment of Arab police officers, and 29% say that they would consider taking a job with the police if they were looking for a job. Considering the challenges of a career in policing, regardless of identity, this response seems quite positive. Similarly, 34% would support a family member who decided to join the police, and an additional 41% would not object to it (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012).

Sectarian Identity in the Iraqi Police and Security Forces

Iraq's Arab population is made up of approximately two-thirds Shia Muslims and one-third Sunni Muslims. The Sunni minority dominated the country's political leadership during most of the 20th century (Dawisha 2009), first under Ottoman rule and more recently under the Baathist regime. Saddam Hussein favored members of his own tribe, most of whom were Sunnis, and largely excluded Shias from state institutions. This political division did not prevent peaceful coexistence between ordinary Iraqis of different sects, however. Sectarian identity was rarely a source of conflict in and of itself. While there were certainly

⁹Author interview, 24 July 2014

instances of violence along sectarian lines under Saddam Hussein, most notably following anti-regime uprisings in 1991 and 1999, violent conflict did not become an everyday occurrence until the US and its allies overthrew the Baathist regime in 2003. In the resulting power vacuum, sectarian organizations and their associated militias suddenly represented the best-established institutions, leading to mass political organization along sectarian lines. Sectarianism was exacerbated by policies intended to root out former regime loyalists which excluded Sunnis from many government jobs. The violence that followed was the result of a sudden and dramatic shift in power, after which the social and political institutions left standing aligned cleavages of political power with those of sectarian identity (Wimmer 2003).

Iraq's domestic security forces are divided into several branches, all of which fall under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Iraqi Police Service, sometimes called the "local police," are responsible for ordinary policing, including traffic enforcement, crime prevention, and criminal investigations. Local police officers are assigned to a specific station and are responsible for the surrounding community. The local police are comparable to an average municipal police force in the United States, except that they fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The largest branch of the domestic security forces is the Federal Police, a national police force responsible for everything from ordinary policing to counterinsurgency. The Federal Police is divided into brigades responsible for specific geographic areas. In most of Iraq the Federal Police supplement the local police primarily on security issues or criminal investigations requiring enhanced resources, while in Baghdad they serve as more of a "full service" police force, blurring the lines between the two groups within the capital.¹⁰ A handful of other law enforcement agencies also operate under the MOI's authority, but this project does not deal directly with these ancillary agencies as they provide highly specialized services which affect citizens differently.

Iraq's security forces underwent a dramatic reconstruction following the 2003 regime change. Like most state institutions, the police were initially subjected to a wave of "de-

¹⁰M.D. Author interview 21 February 2016

baathification.” The policy was intended to remove former regime loyalists from positions of power, but in practice it frequently led to the wholesale removal of bureaucrats, mostly Sunnis, from their posts. Many officers who were not fired simply stopped showing up to work since there was no longer a government in place to issue their paychecks. Over the course of the next decade, various agencies from the US Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice, and State, along with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI), were tasked with rebuilding a functional police force from the ground up.

The role and importance of sectarian identity in the police has varied both over time and from one part of the country to another. Out of necessity, the new police force was constructed first and foremost to provide security, with service-oriented policing relegated to a secondary status.¹¹ As post-war Iraq transitioned through different phases, from US direct control to a democratically-elected government, and from an anti-US insurgency to a full-blown civil war, so too changed the role of the police. Between 2004 and 2007 the vast majority of police officers were Shia (Hashim 2005). De-baathification and the subsequent domination of the 2005 elections by Shia parties allowed for heavy recruitment from party strongholds, including among members of Shia militias (Cole 2007). At the peak of sectarian violence in 2006-2007, the police were viewed largely as a Shia militia whose goal was to suppress the political involvement of Sunni Arabs (Perito 2011). Despite isolated examples of Sunni or Kurdish participation,¹² within months of the new Iraqi regime taking power the state security apparatus was largely co-opted by Shia sectarian interests (Hashim 2005).

Through a combination of US pressure and Iraqi political reform, the “bad apples” within the Iraqi Security Forces were removed and participation of Sunnis in security institutions increased (Robinson 2009). Since the election of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government in the second half of 2014, the Iraqi government – still dominated by Shias – has made a conscious effort to reconcile with Sunnis and to increase their participation within

¹¹Sam Juett, former police trainer at the Jordan International Police Training Academy where tens of thousands of Iraqi police officers were trained. Author Interview 22 February 2016

¹²The 202nd Battalion in Falluja, for example, was made up primarily of Sunni Arabs (Hashim 2005, 311), and security forces in Tal Afar were primarily Kurdish.

the day to day operations of the government.¹³ In December 2014, President Fuad Massoum made a public statement calling for government action “to achieve national reconciliation.”¹⁴ Vice President Iyad Allawi held a series of meetings with tribal leaders in pursuit of national reconciliation. Today, mixed Sunni Arab and Kurdish police units have taken on a high-profile role in operating against the Islamic State (IS) in Nineveh province.¹⁵ In nearby Kirkuk, one report from 2014 describes the city’s police force as ethnically-mixed, citing 40% Kurds, 27% Arabs, 25% Turkmen, and the rest from other minority groups among the city’s 5,000 officers.¹⁶ While the police and security forces remain plagued by their sectarian past, progress towards inclusion and improved service provision has occurred.

The precise distribution of sectarian affiliations within the police is unclear. The US government claimed not to keep track of the sectarian makeup of the Iraqi security forces while it was involved in their reconstruction (Biddle 2006; Sharp 2005). According to Gerald Burke, a former Massachusetts State Police officer who was involved in training the Iraqi police from 2003 to 2006, the US initially tried to implement a policy of sectarian integration in 2003-04 to ensure some degree of representation for all communities.¹⁷ However, the Iraqi MOI told the US that it did not have the necessary information about recruits to engage in any sort of sectarian integration, either with regard to recruitment or to assignment.¹⁸ In practice, recruitment was “sect blind” so long as the DOD was in charge. Today, the police leadership at the station or regional levels almost certainly has an idea of the sectarian

¹³Mustafa, Hamza (2014), “Iraqi President Announces Step Towards National Reconciliation.” *Asharq al-Awsat* 17 December. <http://english.aawsat.com/2014/12/article55339569/iraqi-president-announces-steps-towards-national-reconciliation>

¹⁴Mustafa, Hamza (2014)

¹⁵Morris, Loveday. 2015. “Iraqi Police at Nineveh Liberation Camp Aim to Help Free Mosul but Lack Food and Guns.” *Washington Post*, 15 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/these-iraqis-are-preparing-to-liberate-mosul--as-soon-as-they-have-guns-and-food/2015/01/14/297efc30-95be-11e4-8385-866293322c2f_story.html

¹⁶Author Unknown. “Kirkuk Police Can’t Escape from Iraqi Politics.” *Washington Post*, 14 June. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40219-2004Jun14_2.html?sections=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world. It is not clear how the article arrived at these figures.

¹⁷Author interview 22 January 2016.

¹⁸Such a claim is almost certainly false, as sectarian affiliation can often be determined on the basis of name or hometown. Burke speculates that the real motivation behind withholding this information was to provide Iraqi politicians and bureaucrats with greater leeway for distributing police positions as patronage.

makeup of the officers under their control, but there is no indication that the MOI aggregates this information in any centralized database.

Most officers serve in or near their hometowns, particularly those who engage in “ordinary” policing rather than combating insurgents or militiamen.¹⁹ In rural, highly-segregated areas, this means that most police officers in Shia towns will be Shia, while most Sunni officers will serve in Sunni towns. Within Baghdad and other densely-populated cities, however, short distances between Sunni and Shia “areas,” as well as a prevalence of mixed neighborhoods, means that the correlation between neighborhood demographics and officer demographics is minimal. It is unclear whether an officer’s sect is considered when assigning him or her to areas that are more or less difficult to police; however, because officer assignments are made primarily based on the need for officers and closeness to the officer’s hometown, there is little reason to think that officers of a particular sect would be disproportionately assigned to regions with more conflict or worse citizen-police relations.

Data and Tests

The hypotheses listed above are tested using data from two original surveys, one in 15 cities and neighborhoods across Israel and a second in 22 neighborhoods across the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. The surveys provide individual-level measures of the outcomes of interest, namely support for anti-government violence and fear of repression by the police and government. The surveys were also used to measure information about police integration. Survey measures of this key predictor were employed for three reasons. First, the effect of bottom-up integration on support for violence is explicitly theorized to work via *information about* about integration. What is argued to matter is that citizens believe their group is sufficiently integrated so that it can impose costs on the state. Thus, while it may be possible to measure actual police integration at the local level using officer demographics, this would provide a noisy measure of citizen perceptions about integration. Second, while

¹⁹M.D. Author interview 21 February 2016

reliable data on officer demographics is available for Israel, such data is not available for the Iraqi police. In the Iraqi context, the survey provides a unique opportunity to illuminate the degree of sectarianism in the Iraqi police, including the way in which officers of different identities are distributed across Baghdad.

The third advantage of the surveys is that they allow for an embedded experiment which randomizes information about police integration. A significant methodological concern is that the assignment of officers to different locations might be correlated with local citizen-state relations, potentially confounding the relationship between integration and support for violence. Interviews with police leadership in Israel and police trainers who work with the Iraqi police give no indication that officers are distributed in such a way. Even so, an experiment was embedded within the survey to gain traction on the causal relationship between integration and support for violence.

Survey Design and Sampling

The survey in Israel was enumerated across 8 cities, with 15 primary sampling units due to neighborhood-level sampling procedures in East-Jerusalem. Eight hundred and four individuals were surveyed. Sampling was designed to yield approximately 50% each Jews and non-Jews by selecting locations based on known religious demographics and then selecting a simple random sample within each location. City pairs were selected to achieve both Jewish and non-Jewish units with comparable characteristics.²⁰ Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents by religious identity from each city. Most interviews were carried out by phone, with respondents choosing whether to take the survey in Hebrew or Arabic.

Interviews in East Jerusalem were conducted via door-to-door enumeration. This method was necessary to reach a representative sample of East Jerusalem residents as no suitable sampling frame of phone numbers was available. Neighborhoods²¹ were selected to

²⁰The pairs are Jerusalem-East Jerusalem, Nazareth-Nazareth-Illit, and Rahat-Sderot. The other cities contain significant populations of both Jews and non-Jews.

²¹Old City, French Hill and Sheikh Jarrah, Shuafat and Isawiyya, Mount of Olives

Table 1: Israel Distribution of Respondents

City	Non-Jews	Jews
Akko	34	36
East Jerusalem	104	0
Haifa	65	65
Jerusalem	0	100
Nazareth	123	2
Nazareth Illit	0	50
Rahat	50	0
Sderot	0	50
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	25	100

ensure variation in both exposure to police integration (based on officer data provided by the Israeli police) and political attitudes (based on researcher interviews).²² Enumerators for the door-to-door sampling were East Jerusalem residents of Arab ethnicity. All enumerators were female, as male interviewers would have had difficulty accessing homes in which women were present.

In Iraq, 800 Baghdad residents were interviewed.²³ The sample was limited to Baghdad for several reasons. First, ongoing conflict against the Islamic State would have made surveying in most Sunni areas of Iraq impossible, meaning that the majority of Sunni respondents would have had to come from Baghdad anyway. Limiting Shia respondents to Baghdad allows for more valid comparisons between the two groups. Second, limiting enu-

²²Streets were randomly selected from each neighborhood using a simple random sample. Houses were then selected from a set starting point on each street, and then interviewers continued contacting every second house from this starting point. In multi-home buildings, each apartment was considered to be an individual unit for sampling purposes. Sampling continued on the selected street until the specified number of households were reached. If at that time a sufficient number of households had not been reached within the neighborhood in question, another street was chosen and interviews conducted using the same method. Within each household, enumerators selected the resident with the most recent previous birthday. If the selected resident was unavailable two additional attempts were made to contact them on future dates. If the selected resident still could not be reached, or if the resident refused to participate, the enumerator continued to the next household on the street.

²³In addition to the 800 successfully-completed interviews, enumerators attempted but failed to complete 132 interviews, for a completion rate of 85.8%. If enumerators failed to reach a resident at a selected location after several attempts, or if the resident declined to participate, another household was selected from the remaining occupied households on the street. Among respondents who completed the survey, item non-response rates were low for the majority of questions, with fewer than 15% declining to answer any of the questions used in this analysis.

erator travel time and exposure while traveling between sites reduced risks to their safety. Finally, whereas in most of Iraq there is a significant distinction between the federal and local police forces, within Baghdad these forces operate interchangeably, simplifying both citizen perceptions and the questions needed to accurately measure those perceptions.

The sample was stratified to include 400 Sunni-Arabs and 400 Shia-Arabs.²⁴ Members of other ethnic or religious groups were excluded from the sample. Sectarian affiliation was not asked of respondents due to potential sensitivity. Instead, enumerators coded whether they believed the respondent to be Sunni or Shia based on factors like neighborhood, manner of dress, and other visible items around the home. Enumerators were then asked to list how confident they were in their coding. 85.5% of codings were labeled “completely certain,” 14.25% were “fairly certain,” 0.25% were “more likely than not,” and none were “unsure.” The survey was enumerated in 22 different neighborhoods, with between 10 and 90 interviews per neighborhood proportional to population estimates.²⁵

Enumerators were primarily part-time employees of the survey company, and most have served as enumerators on previous projects for this company. Enumerators worked in teams of 5 to 8, with each team overseen by a supervisor. An effort was made to assign enumerators to their home neighborhoods. Female enumerators were present in every team so that female respondents could be interviewed by a woman. Each interview was conducted by a single enumerator, sometimes overseen by a field supervisor, to minimize conspicuousness.

As in all survey-based research, social desirability bias presents a challenge to validity. Respondents may not answer sensitive items truthfully if they do not want to reveal their preference to the interviewer. While it is impossible to rule out social desirability bias

²⁴Arabs in Baghdad are divided roughly evenly between the two groups.

²⁵The survey was carried out using a multi-stage proportional probability sample. Baghdad Governorate is divided into nine administrative districts, which are further divided into subdistricts and census blocks. A 2010-11 household census served as the sampling frame. Subdistricts were chosen proportionally based on population, and then blocks were chosen within each subdistrict again proportionally based on population. Within each neighborhood, streets were selected using a simple random sample from a list maintained by the survey company. Interviews were conducted on 67 different streets, and typically on between 5 and 25 streets per neighborhood (with a handful of exceptions). Enumerator teams were provided with the sample at the street level, and then the team leader selected households randomly based on a map of occupied households. Within each household, the interview was conducted with the adult who had the next birthday.

entirely, several factors guard against it in this case. First, Adida et al. (2016) note that bias may be exacerbated when respondents and enumerators come from groups in conflict with one another. In Israel, phone interviews took place in the language selected by the interviewer with a fluent speaker of that language. In-person interviews in Arab East Jerusalem used Arab enumerators. While interviewers in Baghdad were not assigned explicitly on the basis of sectarian affiliation, every effort was made to assign interviewers to their home neighborhoods. This means that in the most segregated neighborhoods, i.e. where sectarianism is likely to be highest, interviewers most likely shared the same sectarian identity as the respondents. Second, the most sensitive questions about support for anti-government violence were asked using a technique that shields the respondent’s answers from the interviewer. Finally, interviews were conducted in respondents’ homes in an effort to place them at ease and ensure a low-pressure environment.


Sample Characteristics

Israeli respondents are, by design, approximately half Jewish and half non-Jewish. Within the non-Jewish subgroup, 72.5% are Muslim, 26.5% Christian, and less than 1% Druze. Respondents were also asked whether they identify with a particular ethnic group and given some examples of commonly-used ethnic categories in Israel. The top-right histogram in Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses. The most common responses were Arab (just under 27%), Palestinian (17.5%), Ashkenazi (21%), and Sephardic (21%). Ages of respondents range from 18 (by design) to 91, with a mean of 42.8. Respondents are neutral on their degree of economic satisfaction on average, with slightly more reporting that they are satisfied than unsatisfied.

Iraqi respondents are estimated to be 50% Sunni-Arab and 50% Shia-Arab.²⁶ Respondents were 52% male. The youngest respondents were 18 (by design), while the oldest

²⁶Enumerators reported being “completely confident” in their judgement of 90.75% of those coded as Shia and 80.25% of those coded as Sunni. Only one respondent in each category was coded as “more likely than not.”


Figure 2: Israel Sample Characteristics



was 72, with an average age of 35.5. In terms of education, just over half had at least 11 years of formal schooling. Forty-four percent of respondents either work or have worked in the public sector, or have someone else in their household who does. Of those, 100 work or have worked for the police. Most respondents were displeased with their current economic situation, with 38% either “not at all satisfied” or “somewhat dissatisfied,” and an additional 30% neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. Finally, respondents were asked how many hours of electricity their household receives each day as an objective measure of the relative quality of government service provision. Respondents reported receiving between 10 and 22 hours of

electricity per day – nobody claimed to have a government-provided, interruption-free supply. The median reported number of hours was 16 hours. Sunnis reported receiving about half an hour *more* per day than Shia, a small but statistically-significant difference which contradicts the assumption that the Shia-dominated government biases the distribution of services in favor of Shias.

Figure 3: Iraq Sample Characteristics




Measuring Police Integration

The primary independent variable, police representation, is measured at both the national and local levels. Survey questions are reproduced in Appendix C. Figure 4 shows a fairly even distribution of perceptions about integration at both the national and local levels among Israeli respondents. Figure 5 shows that Iraqis are also normally distributed


with regards to integration at the national level, but their experience at the local level is skewed more towards integrated policing. Finally, Figure 6 shows neighborhood-level averages regarding perceived local police integration across Baghdad. Information about police integration does not appear to correspond with local civilian demographics.

Figure 4: Israel: Perceived Integration



To gain traction on the causal relationship between perceptions about police integration and support for anti-government violence, an experiment was embedded within the survey to randomly prime a subset of respondents with regard to the police’s degree of integration. Respondents were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups and then were read what they were told was an excerpt from a recent news report. In Israel, the report describes the promotion of a police officer to the rank of deputy-chief. In the treatment news report, which comes from a real news story published in 2014, the officer is identified as a Muslim and contains quotes highlighting the inclusion of Arabs within the Israeli police. In the control article the officer’s name is changed to be identity-neutral and he is said to be the first officer promoted to the rank in question from the town of Karmiel, a town in a

Figure 5: Iraq: Perceived Integration



region with significant Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze populations.

The Iraqi version employs a similar design. The “news report” describes the success in crime fighting by a police unit in Kirkuk, an ethnically- and religiously-mixed city. In the treatment group, the success of the unit is attributed to the mixed ethnic and religious identities of its officers. In the control group, the unit’s success is attributed to new technology that allows them to track crime and allocate resources more efficiently. The full text of all vignettes is available in Appendix A. Balance tables are presented in Appendix B; treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable on all observable characteristics.

Results

The primary argument tested is that individuals from minority or vulnerable groups who perceive the police as more integrated should be less likely to support anti-government violence. It was not possible to ask respondents directly whether they would support the use of violence against the state due to concerns about respondent safety in the event that confidentiality were breached. Doing so also would have made respondents exceedingly

Figure 6: Local Police Integration
Baghdad: Perceived Police Integration



uncomfortable, likely leading to high rates of item non-response and dropouts, and raising concerns about untruthful responses. Instead, a list experiment was employed to estimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of violence without being able to trace responses back to individual subjects. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Both groups were asked the same question:

"I am going to read you a list of [4 or 5] strategies that citizens sometimes use when the government does not seem to be listening to them. Please tell me how many of these strategies you would consider using if you felt the government was ignoring your needs. Remember, I don't need to know which ones you would use, only how many of these [4 or 5] you would consider."

Subjects in the "short list" group received a list of four non-controversial items: voting against the government, writing letters to the government, writing letters to an international organization, and protesting peacefully. The "long list" group received the same four items,

Table 2: Israel: Support for Anti-Government Violence

Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference	95% CI
2.097 (.062) 401	2.341 (.066) 402	.244*** (.091)	[-.422, -.065]

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 3: Iraq: Support for Anti-Government Violence

Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference	95% CI
2.155 (.056) 400	2.455 (.067) 400	.300*** (.087)	[-.470, -.129]

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

as well as an additional item, “using non-peaceful methods.” The proportion of respondents who would consider using violence is calculated as the difference in means between the short list and long list groups. Appendix D discusses several issues related to the mechanics and interpretation of the list experiment.

Tables 2 and 3 show that among Israeli respondents, the mean for the long list group is .244 higher than the mean for the short list group, and this difference is significant at the $p < .01$ level. The difference among Iraqis is .300 and is also statistically significant, indicating that on average about 24% of Israelis and 30% of Iraqis would support the use of non-peaceful methods against the government if they felt their needs were being ignored.

To test whether increasing information about police integration reduces support for anti-government violence among minorities, the list experiment groups were randomized within the vignette experiment treatment and control groups to create four versions of the survey: long-treatment, long-control, short-treatment, and short-control, with equal probability of selection into each. Tables 4 and 5 estimate the proportion of minority-group respondents in each country who would support violence for the treatment and control groups. Twenty-nine percent of Arab-Israelis who received the control vignette would consider using violence, a difference that is statistically significant at the $p < .10$ level. Among the treat-

Table 4: Police Integration and Support for Violence (Arab Israelis)

	List Control	List Treatment	<i>Difference</i>
Vignette Control	2.30 (.11) 106	2.59 (.11) 96	0.29 (.16)*
Vignette Treatment	2.60 (.11) 96	2.82 (.11) 103	0.21 (.16)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 5: Integration and Support for Non-Peaceful Methods (Sunni Iraqis)

	4 item	5 item	<i>Difference</i>
Vignette Control	1.92 (.10) 100	2.58 (.14) 100	.66 (.17)***
Vignette Treatment	2.09 (.10) 100	2.15 (.13) 100	.06 (.17)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

ment group, however, the estimate of the proportion that would consider using violence is not significantly distinguishable from zero. In other words, simply hearing a news story that primes responds on the police's status as an integrated institution was sufficient to reduce support for anti-government violence from more than a quarter of respondents to virtually none.

The evidence from Iraq is even stronger. Among Sunnis who received the control vignette, 66% would consider using violence against the government, whereas the proportion who would consider using violence among those who received the integration treatment vignette is not significantly different from 0. In other words, in both Israel and Iraq, a large proportion of respondents in the control group would supported the use of violence, but being primed that the police are integrated reduces support for violence to practically zero. The results strongly support the hypothesis that individuals from vulnerable minority groups are less likely to engage in anti-government violence if they believe that critical policy-implementing institutions, in this case the police, are integrated.

Bottom-Up Integration as a Credible Commitment to Peace

This section tests one possible mechanism by which integration may reduce support for violence, by allowing the government to credibly commit not to repress vulnerable groups. If this is the case, members of these groups should be less likely to fear that they will be repressed by either the police or the government when they believe that the police are integrated. Table 6 shows the results from several models testing this hypothesis in Israel, while Table 7 does the same for Iraq. All models use OLS regression and report standard errors clustered by the primary sampling unit.²⁷ Enumerator fixed effects are included in the Iraq models but not reported for space. In Israel, models control for respondent age and gender. Whether the respondent voted in the previous election is included as a control for civic engagement. A question about economic satisfaction serves as a control for baseline positivity. Models also control for whether the respondent or a member of their household works in the public sector, as well as whether the interview was carried out by phone or in person.

Findings from Israel broadly support the credible commitment mechanism. Perceived integration of the police is associated with reduced fear of the police, both for the full sample (column 1) and for the Arab sub-sample (column 2). Arab Israelis are also more likely to say that they feel secure in their political and human rights when they believe that the police are integrated (column 3). On the other hand, Arab Israelis who perceive that their local police are mixed between people like them and other groups are neither more nor less likely to feel secure in their rights compared to those who perceive the local police to be primarily Jewish. Meanwhile, Arab Israeli respondents who say that their local police are mostly officers from their own group report feeling *less* secure in their political and human rights. This finding is in line with previous research showing that Arab Israelis believe that Arab officers treat them worse in an effort to prove themselves to their Jewish colleagues (Weitzer and Hasisi

²⁷In Israel this provides only 15 clusters, leading to concerns that the model may over-reject the null hypothesis. As a robustness check, models are re-run using a wild cluster bootstrap as recommended by (Cameron et al. 2008). All results hold.

2008). The finding that perceptions of the institution as integrated overall is associated with reduced concerns about repression by police or the government, however, is consistent with the argument that integration *at the institutional level* addresses the credible commitment problem. The differences in findings between national and local-level integration reinforces the argument that what matters is not coethnics governing and serving one another, but rather balancing between groups within key policy-implementing institutions.

Table 6: Israel: Integration and Fear of Repression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Police (All)	Police	Rights Secure	Rights Secure
Integration (Nat'l)	-0.207** (0.0734)	-0.161** (0.0589)	0.260*** (0.0770)	
Police Same				-0.506*** (0.0794)
Police Mix				0.0465 (0.122)
Age	-0.00424* (0.00217)	-0.00733* (0.00363)	0.00134 (0.00342)	0.00272 (0.00281)
Male	-0.173** (0.0799)	-0.211** (0.0868)	-0.0363 (0.0770)	-0.0533 (0.0821)
Vote	-0.109 (0.184)	0.0898 (0.136)	0.252 (0.156)	0.264 (0.148)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.103** (0.0385)	-0.0553 (0.0425)	0.128** (0.0486)	0.128** (0.0416)
Work Public	-0.0729 (0.0611)	-0.0772 (0.103)	0.310** (0.128)	0.377*** (0.105)
In Person	1.102*** (0.131)	1.247*** (0.111)	-0.467** (0.188)	-0.689*** (0.178)
Observations	672	363	345	367
R^2	0.196	0.340	0.250	0.260

OLS regression. Standard errors clustered by PSU. Includes ethnicity and religion fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The results from Iraq, reported in Table 7 provide even stronger evidence in support

of the credible commitment mechanism. Integration of the police nation-wide is associated with decreased fear of the police among both the full sample (column 1) and the Sunni subsample (column 2). Sunnis who believe the police in their neighborhood are mixed are less afraid of the police (column 3) compared to those who believe local officers are “mostly people from other groups.” The results are similar when considering fear of government repression. Sunnis who perceive the police as more integrated at the national level are less likely to fear the government (column 4), as are those who believe their local officers are mixed rather than members of “other groups” (column 5). Finally, the embedded experiment shifted attitudes regarding fear of government repression (column 6). While the overall effect of the integrated policing prime was a slight increase in fear of the government, the prime decreased fear of the government among Sunnis, exactly what we would expect to see if bottom-up integration of the police is serving as a credible commitment device.

Similarly to the findings from Israel, respondents who believe that officers in their neighborhood are primarily members of their own group are *not* less fearful of repression compared to those who believe their local officers are mainly from other groups. Once again, this suggests that the key mechanism is not representation but rather integration. Conflict attitudes are not addressed by allowing individuals to be governed or served by members of their own group (Wimmer 2012) but by creating balance within an institution which demonstrates that the government is not a threat to the security of vulnerable groups. Identity-based autonomy over policing does not address the credible commitment problem because it does not necessarily allow officers from minority groups to disrupt the activities of the government. When police officers from minority or vulnerable are responsible only for policing their coethnics, they cannot impose costs on the state or on other groups by withholding participation. If they were to do so, their own coethnics would be harmed more than anyone else, as they would be the ones from whom policing services were withheld. The greater difficulty in imposing costs on the state under identity-based autonomy makes it a less effective answer to the credible commitment problem. Knowing this, Iraqi Sunnis who

Table 7: Iraq: Integration and Fear of Repression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police (All)	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	-0.324*** (0.0331)	-0.284*** (0.0598)		-0.174*** (0.0462)		
Police Same			0.0347 (0.151)		-0.124 (0.0802)	
Police Mix			-0.297** (0.113)		-0.204*** (0.0677)	
Vignette Treatment						0.0894* (0.0451)
Sunni*Vignette						-0.143** (0.0700)
Sunni	0.359*** (0.109)					0.462*** (0.0598)
Male	-0.237*** (0.0637)	-0.210** (0.0849)	-0.143 (0.0973)	0.0786 (0.0529)	0.114** (0.0534)	0.0592 (0.0414)
Age	0.000404 (0.00218)	0.000435 (0.00260)	-0.00107 (0.00273)	0.00378** (0.00178)	0.00326 (0.00208)	0.00119 (0.00119)
Degree	-0.0109 (0.0377)	0.0299 (0.0530)	0.0568 (0.0571)	0.00917 (0.0240)	0.0273 (0.0243)	0.0555*** (0.0190)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.130*** (0.0344)	-0.122** (0.0468)	-0.147** (0.0555)	-0.0638** (0.0307)	-0.0910** (0.0341)	-0.101*** (0.0182)
Work Public	0.0332 (0.0665)	-0.00885 (0.112)	-0.0860 (0.109)	0.0728 (0.0505)	0.0626 (0.0581)	-0.0680 (0.0409)
Electricity	-0.00742 (0.0120)	0.0195 (0.0137)	0.0310* (0.0161)	-0.0131 (0.00912)	-0.0129 (0.00954)	-0.00147 (0.00751)
District Sunni	-0.0517 (0.0729)	-0.103 (0.0850)	-0.0890 (0.0861)	0.0252 (0.0689)	0.0499 (0.0814)	0.0742* (0.0428)
District Shia	-0.0945 (0.102)					-0.0161 (0.0599)
Observations	755	374	343	337	312	726
R^2	0.447	0.532	0.534	0.264	0.253	0.234

OLS regression. Standard errors clustered by street. Enumerator fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

believe that the police officers in their neighborhood are primarily Sunnis are no less afraid of the government compared to those who believe that officers are primarily Shias.

Dominant-Group Opposition to Police Integration

One concern about police integration in divided societies is that it might be opposed by members of the historically-privileged group, providing them with an incentive to foment conflict at the same time as it reduces the conflict-inducing fears of vulnerable groups. Concerns of the dominant group may center around two issues. First, integration increases the capacity for the previously-excluded group to impose costs on the state or the dominant group which controls it. Yet, the signal of a commitment to peace goes both ways. At the same time as integration allows the government to commit not to repress vulnerable groups, it allows members of vulnerable groups to signal to members of the dominant group that they are willing to participate productively within the existing system and are not interested in overthrowing it. In the case of Israel, exposure to Arabs serving within state institutions and contributing to society via existing state institutions should reassure Jews that Arabs are not intent on overthrowing the government or using extralegal methods of opposition. Integration of the police serves as a two-way signal through which members of both groups are reassured of the other's benign intentions. Second, if the size of the police force does not increase, then integration is zero-sum in the sense that it takes employment opportunities away from members of the dominant group. Members of the dominant group might oppose integration if they believe that they will be harmed by a loss of jobs.

Two survey questions were used to explore these possible impediments to peace. First, on the issue of dominant group concern over changing the balance of power:

“Some people worry that including all ethnic and religious groups into public sector jobs like the police, education, and public services might allow them to disrupt the government. Other people say that including minorities in these jobs allows them to do their part in contributing to society. Which view do you think

is more accurate?”

Among Israeli Jews, 75.8% responded that it is more accurate that integration allows minorities to contribute to society, while less than one-quarter say that it could be dangerous. Iraqi Shias also expressed considerable support for integration, with 88.5% saying that integration allows minority contribution to society. On the issue of taking jobs away from dominant-group members, Israeli Jews and Iraqi Shias were asked,

“Some people worry that a policy of integrating minorities into the police would take jobs away from citizens like you. Do you believe that this is an important concern?”

Israeli Jews seem to be unconcerned by this possibility, with 79.2% answering “no.” Even fewer Iraqi Shias, 84.2%, suggested opposition to integration due to possible job loss. Based on responses to these questions, it seems that neither of these concerns are likely to motivate members of the dominant group to oppose integration. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that respondents felt pressured to provide a certain answer due to social desirability bias, enumerators generally came from the neighborhood being surveyed, mitigating concerns that respondents would provide a “politically correct” answer to avoid offending an outgroup member.

Discussion and Conclusion

The evidence presented in this article supports the argument that integration of the police, and of bureaucratic institutions more generally, plays an important role in determining support for anti-government violence in divided societies. Policy-implementing institutions are an integral part of the political process. Where ascriptive identities are highly politicized, the demographic makeup of bureaucratic institutions like the police has important implications for the citizen-state relationship. The degree to which citizens believe that the police are integrated shapes not only the way in which they view the police but also the way in

which they view the government. In both Israel and Iraq, there is strong evidence that providing information that the police are integrated causes reduced support for anti-government violence among members of minority groups. Integration addresses a credible commitment problem between groups with asymmetric power. Citizens from vulnerable groups who perceive the police as more integrated are less likely to fear repression by the police or by the government, reducing incentives to use violence to resist against the government.

It is also noteworthy that in both Israel and Iraq the vast majority of dominant-group members surveyed do not oppose integration, and in many cases support it. A large majority of Jews in Israel and Shias in Iraq say that they are not worried that integration will take jobs away from people like them, and that integrating minorities into policy-implementing institutions allows members of those groups to do their part in contributing to society. Thus, the reduced support for violent conflict among members of vulnerable groups appear to far outweigh any increased incentives for violence among members of the dominant group.

The findings in both cases reveal that the conflict-reducing effects of integration are the result of sectarian balancing within the institution in question and *not* of representation. Simply recruiting more minority police officers to serve in minority-dominated neighborhoods will not reduce support for anti-government violence. Rather, citizens look for information that the institution as a whole is integrated, making the operations of the group (and implementation of government policies) dependent upon members of their group, and consequently allowing them to impose costs on the government in the event of a conflict.

Two key insights emerge for policymakers seeking to reduce sectarian conflict. First, the way in which minorities are included within policy-implementing institutions matters. It is not necessarily sufficient to include groups proportional to their share of the overall population. Particularly for smaller groups, proportionality may be insufficient to impose costs on the government or dominant group, making it a poor solution for the credible commitment problem. Similarly, identity-based autonomy over service provision does not appear to have the same fear-reducing effects as true integration, as it does not address the

underlying power asymmetries which foment conflict.

Second, information about integration is as important as actual changes in institutional inclusiveness. The bottom-up integration matters only to the extent that citizens are aware of it. This argument is supported by the strong effects of *knowledge* about integration on support for anti-government violence, as well as on fear of the police and government. Simply hearing a news story which highlighted the integrated nature of the police was sufficient to significantly reduce support for violence. Thus, policymakers seeking to use bottom-up integration to reduce conflict must find a way to provide credible information to citizens that the institution in question is integrated.

Follow-up research should address two questions. First, while this analysis focuses on one institution, the police, the theory of bottom-up integration applies to all policy-implementing institutions, for instance education, public healthcare, sanitation, and the fire department. Future work might test bottom-up integration in other institutional contexts. Second, this article tests one possible mechanism connecting perceived integration with reduced support for conflict, fear of repression. While there is robust support for this mechanism, it almost certainly works concurrently with other mechanisms. For example, to the extent that integration affects the quality and distribution of service provision, it might reduce conflict-inducing grievances (Gurr 1970; Weitzer 1995; Wimmer 2013). Additionally, conflict attitudes have been linked to exclusion from the state (Cederman et al. 2010). Integration reduces exclusion by providing government jobs to previously-excluded groups. Future research should test these and other mechanisms.

Finally, this article deals with a bottom-up process of integration in which ordinary individuals are integrated into low-level bureaucratic positions. This process stands in contrast to typical power sharing strategies which are based on control over leadership or decision-making institutions. The focus on ordinary individuals rather than elites, and on policy-implementing rather than policy-making institutions, provides a significant contribution to the discussion of institutional solutions to sectarian violence. Given the track

record of power sharing in countries like Lebanon and Iraq, this article suggests that the missing link in its implementation may be the lack of attention towards the institutions that are responsible for interpreting laws, implementing policies, and distributing goods and services. In other words, traditional power sharing deals with only part of the political process. Bottom-up integration addresses an equally critical portion of politics, providing new opportunities for institutional design in divided societies.

A Vignettes

Israel

Treatment:

I would like to read you a very short newspaper article that was published recently on an Israeli news website.

The title of the article is, “Muslim Police Officer Ascends to New Heights”

Deputy Inspector-General Jamal Hakroush on Wednesday became the first Muslim police officer to ascend to his rank in Israel. He was recently nominated to the office of deputy chief of the Traffic Department.

“It’s a position I have been waiting for, and it offers many challenges,” Hakroush told reporters. “I am proud of the Israel Police for choosing me based on my qualifications and nothing else.”

The officer added, “My religion and origin are facts I do not ignore, but I have never, in all my years of service, felt discriminated against or hurt by it.”

Hakroush says his home village of Kfar Kana has offered a lot of support. “People from all over the village called to congratulate me. I am proud to be the first Muslim officer to carry the rank of deputy inspector-general in Israel Police,” he told his associates Wednesday.”

Control:

I would like to read you a very short newspaper article that was published recently on an Israeli news website.

The title of the article is, “Local Police Officer Ascends to New Heights”

Deputy Inspector-General Halu on Wednesday became the first police officer from Karmiel to ascend to his rank in Israel. He was recently nominated to the office of deputy-director of the Traffic Department.

“It’s a position I have been waiting for, and it offers many challenges,” Halu told reporters. “I am proud of Israel Police for choosing me based on my qualifications and nothing else.”

Halu says his home town of Karmiel has offered a lot of support. “People I have not talked to since school called to congratulate me. I am proud to serve in

the Israel Police and look forward to contributing to the police in my new role,” he told reporters.

Iraq

Treatment:

I would like to read you a few paragraphs from a news story that was in a newspaper just the other day. The story is about a police unit in Kirkuk. The title of the article is, “Police Break Sectarian Barriers to Serve Citizens.”

Unit 218 of the Iraqi Police Service has been receiving attention lately thanks to its successes in maintaining order in the Arrapha neighborhood of Kirkuk. The secret to the unit’s success, according to one Lieutenant, lies in its officers’ diversity:

“Of the 140 officers in my unit, we have individuals from all different religious and ethnic groups of Iraq. We are Shias, Kurds, Sunnis, Turkmen, and we all work together to serve the community.”

“When citizens see us patrolling together, they trust us. They see Kurds and Arabs, Shia and Sunni working side by side and they know that we are not a force belonging to once community or another. We are the Iraqi Police, and we serve Iraqi citizens.”

According to a high-level official in Baghdad, unit 218 is serving as a new model for policing across the country. The Ministry of the Interior has announced an initiative to increase the diversity of police recruits from each of Iraq’s sects in the coming months in an effort to improve the quality of service.

This is the end of the news story.

Control:

I would like to read you a few paragraphs from a news story that was in a newspaper just the other day. The story is about a police unit in Kirkuk. The title of the article is, “Police Use Technology to Serve Citizens.”

Unit 218 of the Iraqi Police Service has been receiving attention lately thanks to its successes in maintaining order in the Arrapha neighborhood of Kirkuk. The secret to the unit’s success, according to one Lieutenant, lies in its officers’ use of technology:

“We have adopted a computerized reporting system. The system allows us to

record crimes and incidents in a centralized database. We can use all of the information to find patterns and decide where to send resources.”

“Instead of waiting for citizens to call us after a problem has already happened, this new technology helps us know where to go to prevent incidents from happening in the first place.”

According to a high-level official in Baghdad, unit 218 is serving as a new model for policing across the country. The Ministry of the Interior has announced an initiative to increase the police’s use of technology in the coming months in an effort to improve the quality of service.

This is the end of the news story.

Table 8: Israel: Vignette Balance Table

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr T > t $
Male	.459	.506	.181
Age	43.3	42.6	.580
Vote	.779	.785	.841
Economic Satisfaction	3.18	3.22	.591
Work Public Sector	.337	.338	.999
Police Integration (Nat'l)	1.99	2.06	.165
n	403	401	

Table 9: Israel: List Experiment Balance Table

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr T > t $
Male	.457	.507	.159
Age	45.1	40.1	.001**
Vote	.791	.774	.563
Economic Satisfaction	3.15	3.26	.167
Work Public Sector	.341	.334	.843
Police Integration (Nat'l)	2.03	2.03	.997
n	402	402	

B Balance Tables

Table 10: Iraq: Vignette Balance Table

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr T > t $
Male	.50	.51	.322
Age	35.97	34.99	.258
Degree	.87	.79	.167
Economic Satisfaction	2.85	2.76	.281
Electricity (hours/day)	15.75	15.72	.907
n	400	400	

Table 11: Iraq: List Experiment Balance Table

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr T > t $
Male	.55	.50	.157
Age	35.61	35.35	.757
Degree	.82	.84	.665
Economic Satisfaction	2.79	2.82	.675
Electricity (hours/day)	15.74	15.73	.963
n	400	400	

C Measurement of Perceived Police Integration

Israel

National Integration:

“In general, how integrated would you say the Israeli police are? By integrated I mean that members of many different ethnic and religious groups serve together side by side. Throughout Israel in general, would you say that the police are very integrated, somewhat integrated, or not at all integrated?”

Local Integration:

“Now please think specifically about your neighborhood. How often do you see or hear about Jewish and non-Jewish officers working together? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?”

Iraq

National Integration:

“Throughout Iraq in general, would you say that the police fairly include members of all different ethnic and religious groups? Please answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being not at all fairly and 5 being completely fairly.”

Local Integration:

“In your neighborhood, how often do you see ordinary police officers from different ethnic or religious groups working together side by side? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?”

Finally, we might want to disaggregate perceptions of non-integrated policing into in-group and out-group policing. Subjects were asked,

“Would you say that the security forces in your area are mostly people like you, mostly people from other groups, or a mix of the two?”

Table 12: List Experiment: Support for Non-Peaceful Methods (Iraq)

Number of Items	Control	Treatment	Total
0	4	3	7
1	135	128	263
2	134	95	229
3	49	57	106
4	78	92	170
5		25	25
Total	400	400	800

D List Experiment: Mechanics and Interpretation

Table 12 shows the frequency of responses by group for the list experiment in Iraq. The logic behind a list experiment is that subjects do not reveal their individual response – it is possible for the researcher to determine only how many items on the list a respondent would choose, but not which one(s) he or she would choose. Of course, anonymity breaks down if respondents select all of the items on the treatment list. Such a “ceiling effect” makes it obvious that the respondent has selected the controversial item. Table 12 shows that 25 subjects in the treatment group said they would consider using all 5 of the methods listed if they felt the government was ignoring their needs.

One possibility is that these 25 subjects were being honest, and either did not understand that answering this way revealed their response or simply did not care. If this is the case, it is also likely to be true that other subjects also would have considered all five but did not say so for fear of revealing their answer on the controversial item. This scenario would cause us to underestimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of non-peaceful methods.

A second possibility is that these 25 subjects, or some subset of them, either were not paying careful attention to the survey question or did not understand the question and simply picked an answer. As long as these subjects arrived at the answer of “5” randomly, then we are simply observing noise in the data. The proportion calculated in Table 3 should be considered a conservative estimate. It may under-count the proportion of respondents who would consider using violence but is unlikely to over-count them. Finally, while this ceiling effect decreases the confidence with which we can estimate the proportion of respondents would use non-peaceful methods, it should not affect our ability to draw inferences about the difference between the vignette treatment and control groups (news article primes about integration), since these were randomly assigned.

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